Abstract -In mobile ad hoc networks, data transmission is tunneling, this attack imposes severe threats to ad hoc performed within an untrusted wireless environment. Various network routing protocols. For example, in AODV, the path kinds of attack have been identified and corresponding solutions with smallest hop count is selected. Since the malicious nodes have been proposed. Wormhole attack is one of the serious are acting as neighbors, the AODV routing protocol would attacks which forms a serious threat in the networks, especially get wrong hop count information and select an inappropriate against many ad hoc wireless routing protocols and location-. . based wireless security system. We identify two types of ath. Malicious nodes can also lure other nodes to send traffic wormhole attacks. In the first type, malicious nodes do not take through them by advertising apparently short paths so as to part in finding routes, meaning that, legitimate nodes do not launch other attacks to the data packets. malicious. Some researchers have proposed detection information in apacket to restrictuthe transmission distance of mechanisms for the first type. In this paper, we propose an the packet so as to avoid tunneling. The authors called the efficient detection method called Delay Per Hop Indication information packet leash and they proposed two types of (DelPHI). By observing the delays of different paths to the packet leashes: geographical leash and temporal leash. In the receiver, the sender is able to detect both kinds of wormhole geographical leashes, the location information and loosely attacks. This method requires neither synchronized clocks nor synchronized clocks together verify the neighbor relation. In special hardware equipped mobile nodes. The performance of the temporal leashes, the packet transmission distance is DelPHI is justified by simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are also some other methods proposed to defense against wormhole attacks. In [6] , distributed Network A f mobile airelessdehocnetw forlebypp arompup, Monitors were developed to monitor the control messages of of mobile wireless devices, shas mobiela computers, the AODV routing protocol, and observe whether the PDAs, and wireless phones, that cooperatively communicate beairvoae h crec eair atrdb h with each other without a fixed network infrastructure [1] . It generally uses a wireless radio communication channel. The specifications. This "correct behavior" is pre-defined in the advantages of MANET are rapid deployment and low cost of monitors and is manually configured.
operation. On the other hand, MANET utilizes an untrusted [10] studied how to enhance the security of routing environment for data transmission, and therefore it is protocol in ad hoc networks. The defense mechanism simply subjected to various kinds of security attacks [2, 3] .
uses the fastest path, instead of using the path with smallest For example, the blackhole attack refers to an attacker hop count. It can prevent wormhole attack with actual path which drops allthe traffic.passinwhite length longer than the false hop count produced by the which drops all the traffic passing through it, while wte malicious pair. However, it is not a detection mechanism. hole attack refers to an attacker floods the network with a m large amount of traffic. An attacker can also easily eavesdrop The mechanism developed in [11] , called SECTOR, on communication, record packets, and replay the packets in assumes each node is equipped with a special hardware that wireless networks. Most of these attacks have been can respond to a one-bit challenge without any delay. The extensively investigated, and the proposed solutions, such as challenger measures the round-trip-time (RTT) of the signal the watchdog and the pathrater [5] , provide encouraging with an accurate clock to calculate the distance between the results [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
nodes. The probability that an attacker can guess all bits All the attacks mentioned above are preformed by a single correctly decreases exponentially as the number of challenges increases. attacker. In this paper, we focus on an attack which is launched by a pair of collaborating attackers: wormhole In [12] , similar to SECTOR, per-hop RTT is used for the attack [8, 9, 10] . In a wormhole attack, an attacker records detection of a wormhole attack. Whenever a node receives a packets (or bits from a packet) at one location in the network, route request message, before forwarding, it will send a tunnels them to a second attacker in another location, and the verification message to the pervious node and wait for the packets are replayed by the second attacker there. Since the reply. The synchronization and position information, and it does not require the mobile nodes to be equipped with some special Tb) Exposed ack hardware, which in turns provides higher power efficiency. Fig. 1 . Two types of wormhole attacks The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We neighbors. Let's consider the situation where S wants to first present and compare two kinds of wormhole attacks in establish a route to R. As illustrated in Fig. l(b) , when MI the next section. In Section III, we present our DelPHI receives the packet, it modifies the pervious hop field to MI detection mechanism. The performance of DelPHI is and increases the hop count by 1. Then the RREQ packet is evaluated by simulations in Section IV. In Section V, we tunneled to M2 and M2 performs the same setup procedure address the message overhead issue and finally, we conclude and broadcasts the RREQ packet to R. R finds its previous the paper in Section VI.
hop is M2 with hop count equals to 3. [8] provide solution to the hidden attack the packet and the packet header, even the packet is an based on this observation. The main idea behind packet AODV advertisement packet. Instead, they simply tunnel the leashes is to limit the transmission distance to one hop. In the packet from one point and replay it at another point. This first case in Fig. 1 (a), S and R treat themselves as neighbor, kind of wormhole attacks makes the sender treat the receiver but in reality, they are a few hops away, therefore wormhole as its immediate neighbor. Suppose that S wants to establish a can be detected by packet leashes in R. However, it is not the route to R using AODV. S would broadcast a RREQ message. case in the exposed attack in Fig. 1 
(b). 5 knows M is its
Any node that receives the RREQ should check whether it neighbor, and R knows M2 is its neighbor, both transmission knows how to get to R. If not, it should continue to broadcast distances are found to be within one hop, i.e. {S, Ml} and RREQ if it receives RREQ for the first time. It should also {M2, R}. Hence wormhole is not detected. update the hop count information and put its identity in the Similar to packet leashes, the main idea of SECTOR [11] packet header. However, in the hidden attack, malicious and the mechanism in [12] are to calculate the upper bound nodes do not update the packet header as it should. As shown on the distance within one hop. Thus they also cannot provide in Fig. l(a) , the packet from S is received by MI, then MI solution to the exposed wormhole attack problem. tunnels the packets to M2 and replays them to R, without
The mechanisms proposed in [6, 10] both the hidden and exposed attacks, we devise DelPHI, which will be described in detail in the following section.
-
In our DelPHI wormhole detection presented in this paper, we collect both hop count and delay information of disjoint (b) DREP roadmap paths and calculate the delay/hop value to serve as the Fig. 2 . Two possible disjoint paths indicator of detecting wormhole attacks, which provides a general solution for both kinds of wormhole attacks. The but not the whole path information simply because of saving reason behind is that under normal situation, the delay a the network resources. If the path is long, then the packet will packet experiences in propagating one hop should be similar be large. along each hop along the path. However, under a wormhole When the sender initiates DelPHI wormhole detection, it attack, the delay for propagating across false neighbors broadcasts a DREQ packet to the receiver, which is illustrated should be unreasonably high since there are in fact many in Fig. 2(a) . The previous hop field is filled with the sender's hops between them. Therefore, if we compare the delay per node ID, the hop count field is set to 1, and the timestamp hop of a legitimate path with the delay per hop of a path that field is set with the time when the packet is sent. The is under wormhole attack, we should find that the delay/hop previous hop field and the hop count field will be modified of the legitimate path is smaller. Therefore, if a path has a by intermediate nodes while the timestamp field is never distinguishable high delay/hop value, it is likely to be changed by other nodes, even the receiver. Therefore, the subjected to a wormhole attack.
sender should protect the integrity of the timestamp. This can To avoid the need of synchronized clocks, positioning be achieved by signing the message authentication code of device and other special hardwares, DelPHI collects the timestamp. information and performs detection at the sender. DelPHI
When an intermediate node receives a DREQ packet, it obtains delay and hop count information in a way similar to records the previous hop field and establishes a reverse path the AODV route setup mechanism [13] . When the detection to the sender. Then it puts its node ID into the pervious hop is initiated, the sender broadcasts a request message to the field and increases the hop count field by 1. The resulted receiver, and the receiver replies all the request messages DREQ packet is then broadcasted.
received. In this way, the sender can obtain the information of some disjoint paths to the receiver. By comparing the The forwarding of DREQ is somewhat similar to the delay/hop values among these disjoint paths, a wormhole can AODV RREQ forwarding. Any node in the network be identified.
broadcasts DREQ received and sets up a reverse path when it receives the packet in the first time. When the same packet is There are two phases in our mechanism. In the first phase, received at the second time, it can be simply dropped. Unlike delay and hop count information is collected In the second the AODV route setup, a node must forward the DREQ no phase, the sender analyzes the information obtained in the matter there is a record in its routing When the receiver gets a DREQ, it unicasts a DREP packet AODV RREQ and RREP packets, DREQ is used for the to the sender through the reverse path, and is illustrated in Fig. sender to find disjoint paths to the receiver, while DREP is 2(b). It puts its node ID in the pervious hop field, sets the hop sent from the receiver back to the sender to identify paths. count field to 1, and copies the timestamp field of the DREQ Both DREQ and DREP packets include a pervious hop field, packet to the DREP packet. Similar to the request procedure, hop count field, and a timestamp field. We use pervious hop an intermediate node puts its node ID into the pervious hop field and increases the hop count field by 1 upon receiving h-DPH the DREP packet. Every intermediate node only forwards the DREP packet once for each corresponding DREQ.
Normal Tunneled Noted that the receiver replies to every DREQ packet Fig. 3 . Relationship of normal and tunneled paths received (compare with AODV, receiver only replies to the RTT. It can be explained by the fact that a shorter path should first RREQ received), and each node only broadcasts the have a smaller round trip time. Hence the DPHs of normal DREQ packet once. Hence the sender can receive a number paths should have similar values independent to h.
of DREP packets where each of them follows a path which is However, it is not the case in the paths which suffer from disjoint from the paths of other DREP packets. In other words, wormhole attacks. Recall that a tunnel is formed by two the DREP packets collect information of a set of disjoint malicious nodes. No matter how long the tunnel is, the paths from the sender to the receiver. As shown in Fig. 2(b) , S malicious pair MI and M2 advertise to others that they are 1 can receive 2 DREP packets, one from MI and one from A.
hop away. Therefore, the longer the tunnel, the larger the RTT, Each DREP carries the hop count information of the path but the hop count remains the same. The resulted DPH value that it is associated with. It also carries the timestamp of the will be larger than normal path. time that the sender sent the corresponding DREQ. Therefore, We performed some simulations and observed that the the round trip time of the path is the time difference between DPH values of normal paths usually appear as small values the time at which the sender receives DREP and the when compared with those of tunneled paths. It can be easily timestamp carried in DREP. Then, the sender is able to observed that the DPH values of normal and tunneled paths calculate the delay/hop value of the corresponding path.
form two separate groups as shown in Fig. 3 . The difference DREQ and DREP packets could be lost. To enhance between "the smallest DPH in the tunneled group" and "the reliability of the information collected, the data collection largest DPH in the normal group" is always larger than the procedure is repeated 3 times. It is possible that the hop gap between any 2 DPH values within the same group. counts of the three DREPs received from the same neighbor Fig. 2 , that during the than DPH, are treated as under wormhole attack. second broadcast, E receives a DREQ from C prior than D, then the path formed becomes {S, A, B, C, E, R}, and S As our detection mechanism is based on the receives a DREP from A with hop count set to 5. Knowing distinguishable difference of DPH values between normal that there is a path to R through A is 4 hops away, the 5-hop paths and tunneled paths, DelPHI does not work well when information is ignored. Similarly, if the first broadcast obtains all the paths are tunneled. How to enhance DelPHI to work the 5-hop information while the 4-hop information is also in the situation when all the paths are attacked is left for obtained in a later broadcast, then the 5-hop record is deleted future work. and updated by the 4-hop data. If there are two trials of 4-hop IV PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS and one trial of 5-hop, we take the average of the two 4-hop trials for phase 2.
In this section, the performance of DelPHI is evaluated by In the case of normal path, as explained in Section 111(B), space limitation, we only present some representative results RTT is directly proportional to h. Therefore the DPH value is in this paper. The settings of these simulations are as follows: independent to the tunnel length, and it gives the reason why (a) L =1000, N= 50; (b) L=750, N= 30; and (c) L=500, N the detection rate stays at the same level throughout the 15. Please note that a smaller network has a shorter tunnel.
simulation. For each setting, we generated 1000 different networks Another set of simulations were conducted with with random node placement. In these 1000 networks, we background traffic. The background traffic was set in the ignored those where all the paths are tunneled. We then following way: Connections are setup in randomly chosen measured the detection rate over these remaining networks, non-overlapping node pairs, i.e. there is only one-to-one which are more than 900 topologies for each setup.
transmission, no node is a sender of more than 1 connection We first conducted simulations with different settings and no node is a receiver of more than 1 connection. against different threshold values (1), the results are shown in Fig. 6 presents the result when there is heavy background Tables 1-3 . Column "Normal path" refers to the percentage of traffic. We define heavy as all nodes are having connections, normal paths (paths that are not attacked) that are detected i.e. the number of connections equals to 5000 of the number correctly. Column "Tunneled path" is defined in a similar way. of nodes. It is found that the detection rate of tunneled path is As expected, the smaller the threshold (1) is, the easier to much higher than that with no background traffic. And the detect wormhole attack. However, it also leads to a higher detection rate of normal path is only slightly decreased. rate of treating a normal path as a tunneled path if no path is under wormhole attack. Since smaller L has a larger chance It can be explained as follows: Due to the claimed small that the tunnel is short, the DPH values of tunneled paths and hop count through the wormhole,at traffic will choose this normal paths become comparably close, which in turns lower path as their shortest path, which leads to heavy congestion in the detection rate (will be explained by further simulations the tunnel. Therefore, the DPH value through the tunneled later). In order to maintain the detection rate of normal paths path is dramatically increased. The difference between the above 900o and that of wormhole paths should be remained as DPH of tunneled path and that of normal path becomes more high as possible, we set T= 3ms in the following simulations, obvious and larger than T. Therefore the detection rate of wormhole attack is higher. For the normal paths, since there been evaluated by conducting various simulations using the is background traffic, the DPH value is also increased. When ns simulator. It has been shown that DelPHI can achieve no path is under wormhole attack, a gap may appears because higher than 95% in detecting normal path and 90% in of the delay due to background traffic. Hence, the detection detecting wormhole attack, in the absence of background rate is slightly decreased, as shown in Fig. 6 . traffic. Simulations has also shown that DelPHI can maintain Finally, we conducted simulations with light background above 85% detection rate for both normal and tunneled paths traffic and the result is shown in Fig. 7 . In this simulation, we given that there is background traffic.
randomly choose connection pairs with the number of The message overhead of DelPHI has also been addressed connections equals to 1000 of the number of nodes. Again, the in this paper. We compared it with AODV route setup detection rate of wormhole is higher than that with no procedures and found that the major factor is the triple background traffic, and the detection rate of normal path is request procedures in providing reliability. There is a tradeoff similar to that with heavy background traffic. It can be between providing reliability of DelPHI and minimizing the explained by the same reason in the last simulation with message overhead, and may need further investigation. heavy background traffic.
